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Abstract 
 
This thesis evaluates the new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and accompanying 
Guidelines regarding their treatment of selective distribution. Further, it makes a prospective 
examination of the view on selective distribution in European Competition Law, especially 
regarding online sales. 
During the ten years that passed since the last Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and 
accompanying Guidelines were introduced, the global market has developed in a rushing 
speed, much thanks to the Internet. The growing online markets have created enormous 
opportunities as well as problems, by shrinking the world and completely change the 
possibility to control markets. Therefore, the treatment of online distribution was at heart of 
the discussion when the old rules were to be reviewed. The main issues approached were the 
application of the concepts of “active” and “passive” sales on the internet and the ways in 
which suppliers may restrict the online behaviour of their distributors within exclusive and 
selective distribution systems.  
The review of the old rules led to an intense debate between the promoters for selective 
distribution systems on one side and the so called pro-internet lobby on the other. The former 
argued for the importance of controlling the online behaviour of appointed distributors, while 
the latter held that all restrictions on online sales must be individually justified and not benefit 
from the Block Exemption. 
The final result appears to be a compromise and the Commission has more than anything tried 
to find ways of translating the rules on offline distribution to online sales, giving wide 
opportunities for distributors to operate online once they have a physical point of sales. The 
Commission has done quite well in its ambition to clarify the rules on internet distribution 
even if some uncertainties remain. Whilst continuing towards a more economic approach, it 
has been clearly influenced with the aim for market integration, which can be seen in the 
tough treatment of restraints hindering parallel trade and the protection of differential price 
settings on markets within the European Union.  
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Part I - Introduction 
1. Subject background 
Since EU Competition Law aims to protect not only an undistorted competition, but also the 
creation of a single market, it has a tradition of treating vertical restraints very strictly. For 
many years the Commission refused to recognise the vertical restraints could be pro 
competitive and instead it adopted a very strict approach, where the aim for a single market 
clearly stood above economic efficiency. After being heavily criticised during the 1990‟s, the 
Commission issued a Vertical Block Exemption Regulation with accompanying guidelines in 
2000. This was the start of a new, more economic based approach that ruled EU Competition 
Law at the start of the new millennium. The Block Exemption Regulation and Vertical 
Guidelines expired 31 May 2010 and the new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) 
and Vertical Guidelines entered into force the day after. During the decade that has passed 
since the last Regulation and Guidelines were introduced, the global market has developed in 
a rushing speed, much thanks to the Internet. To describe the ways that internet has changed 
the conditions under which business is carried on can hardly be done. At the same time as 
creating enormous opportunities, the growing online markets have created troubles for both 
legislators as well as market actors, by shrinking the world and completely change the 
possibility to control markets. Therefore, online distribution was at heart of the discussion 
when the old rules were to be reviewed. The main issues were the application of the concepts 
of “active” and “passive” sales on the internet and the suppliers' ability to restrict online sales 
by distributors within exclusive and selective distribution systems.  
As a part of its review, the Commission consulted third parties through an Issues Paper 
followed by a draft version of the new Block Exemption Regulation and accompanying 
Guidelines long before the old rules expired. Regarding selective distribution, these 
consultations led to an intense debate with the promoters for such systems on one side and the 
so called pro-internet lobby on the other, stating that selective distribution deserves cautious 
treatment and that all restrictions on online sales must be individually justified and not benefit 
from the block exemption. 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and 
accompanying Guidelines regarding their treatment of selective distribution, as well as 
prospectively examine the view on selective distribution in European Competition Law, 
especially regarding online sales. 
In doing so it is essential to examine the following: 
 What interests are protected in the new VBER and Vertical Guidelines? Is market 
integration in focus or are they inspired by a more economical approach?  
 Are the rules foremost protecting the freedom of the supplier to choose in which way 
to distribute its goods, or are they more concerned with consumer welfare? 
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 What changes are made regarding selective distribution? 
 Has the Commission succeeded in its aim to clarify the rules on online sales? 
 Has legal certainty got lost in the aim for flexibility and the effect based approach? 
1.3 Method and material 
The first part of this thesis encompasses a review of European Competition Law and case-law 
relevant to selective distribution. Guidance and data is also sought in reliable publications in 
this field, such as legal doctrine and articles. Regarding the review of the old Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation with accompanying Guidelines and online distribution, guidance and 
data is instead primarily sought in reliable online material such as legal and economic 
publications, since traditional material does not address the issues subject to discussion within 
this sphere. 
1.4 Delimitations 
Even though the new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and accompanying Guidelines 
concern all vertical restraints, the topic is narrowed down to one certain restraint, namely 
selective distribution. Other restraints in vertical distribution agreements such as territorial 
restraints or resale price maintenance will not be elaborated upon  
The thesis does not touch upon the rules on motor vehicle distribution, which is subject to a 
different Block Exemption Regulation. The part regarding online sales does not elaborate on 
music distribution, since this is primarily not an issue of selective distribution. 
In the examination of the review of the old rules the thesis mainly presents the view of two 
parties, one from the luxury industry and the other a part of the pro-internet lobby. 
1.5 Outline 
After this introductory part on the topic of selective distribution, follows part three with an 
overview of the European Competition Law, followed by part four which deals with the 
treatment of selective distribution in European Competition Law. In part five focus shifts to 
Internet distribution and the new rules on online sales are discussed. Finally, in part six the 
analysis is taken one step further so as to discuss the results of the questions asked above and 
so as to transmit to the reader the most central conclusions drawn throughout the course of the 
entire thesis.  
 
Part II - Selective distribution 
1. Selective distribution systems 
A supplier can distribute its products in a number of ways. To start with, it can distribute the 
products through vertical integration, either within the company or through controlled 
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subsidiaries. It may also take use of an agent, who sells the products in the name of the 
supplier or use a franchise system where the dealers use the supplier‟s intellectual resources to 
distribute the product. Finally, a supplier may use independent distributors to reach out to the 
customers. 
When distributing goods and services through independent distributors, many suppliers 
choose to conclude long term agreements, rather than one time contracts. To ensure that the 
products in question are sold under the right circumstances, it is common to use selective 
distribution, especially for final branded products.
1
 In a selective distribution system a 
supplier agrees to supply only distributors fulfilling certain criteria, so called authorised 
distributors, which in return agree to sell only to other authorised distributors and end users.
2
 
Selective distribution is the only method apart from agency through which a supplier may 
control the channels of distribution all the way to the end users.
3
 
There are two main kinds of selective distribution systems; pure qualitative systems where the 
supplier appoints only distributors that meet qualitative criteria primarily linked to the nature 
of the product, and systems with quantitative restrictions, where the supplier restricts the 
number of resellers in certain market territories. As will be seen below, purely qualitative 
selective distribution systems are normally not a threat to competition, but rather beneficial. 
Systems with quantitative restrictions on the other hand, are often considered harmful for 
competition.
4
 This kind of selective distribution has obvious similarities with exclusive 
distribution agreements in that they restrict the number of authorised distributors within an 
area at the same time as they determine certain conditions under which resale of the products 
is to be made. The main difference between the two models is that selective distribution 
systems restrict selling on any sales to non-authorised distributors, as well as restricting sales 
to other territories, where exclusive distribution only regulates the latter. Hence, a selective 
distribution system leaves only appointed dealers and final customers as possible buyers and 
thus thwarts potential free-riders. Combinations of exclusive distribution and selective 
distribution are therefore considered hazardous for competition if it restricts the selected 
distributors‟ right to actively sell to each other and to end users.5  
2. Potential harms and benefits of Selective Distribution 
The use of selective distribution systems can have both pro-competitive and anti-competitive 
effects. Historically, courts and competition authorities, especially in Europe, have been 
unwilling to make use of economics in their decision making.
6
 However, nowadays they 
increasingly use economic theories to determine whether a provision is to be considered as 
anti-competitive.
7
 From an economic point of view, all agreements regarding vertical 
                                                          
1
 Vertical Guidelines para 174. 
2
 Article 1(d) VBER. 
3
 Goyder, J. EU Distribution Law, p 66. 
4
 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. EC Competition Law, text cases and materials p 646. 
5
 See e.g.  Vertical Guidelines para 176. 
6
 See e.g. Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. EC Competition Law, text cases and materials, p 618 ff. 
7
 Ibid p 624. 
9 
 
restraints are capable of being either pro- or anti-competitive, and the outcome depends on the 
circumstances.
8
 
2.1 Potential Benefits 
Generally it can be said that there are two main reasons to impose a selective distribution 
system, namely to maintain certain standards and qualities of branded products and to protect 
marketing and service investments by the distributors.  As will be seen, there are several 
benefits to selective distribution, such as prevention of free-riding and manufacturer 
opportunism, which benefit consumers through making distributors want to invest in sales 
services. To impose vertical restraints such a selective distribution system is costly for the 
suppliers, why they would only do this where it provides some benefits to the upstream 
suppliers.
9
  
2.1.1 Protection of Brand Image  
For many goods, especially in the luxury industry, the right brand image is vital for enhancing 
the demand of the product. To ensure that the customers are receiving the right image, the 
supplier needs to require its retailers to invest in exclusive showrooms, sales assistance and a 
comfortable shopping experience. The retailer will not only have to be able to provide the 
right information to the right customer, but also make sure that the advertisement and the 
presentation of the products is of such kind that it suits the brand.
10
 Hence, to protect brand 
image it is necessary for manufacturers and suppliers to be able to choose to sell their goods 
only to distributors with the right qualities. The supplier imposes restraints on distribution 
with the aim of promoting the provision of services which are appreciated by consumers, 
thereby enhancing their demand, which, when used in the right way under the right 
circumstances, benefits the supplier itself as well as its distributors and customers. To allow a 
manufacturer to protect the image of its branded products also means allowing consumers 
who appreciate the value of such goods to enjoy them.  Without the possibility to protect the 
image of branded goods, such products might disappear from the market and leave the 
consumers with less to choose from.
11
 
2.1.2 Protection from Free-riding and Opportunism 
2.1.2.a Free-riding 
Free-riding occurs when one market actor takes advantage of the investments and inputs from 
another market actor.
12
 The issue can arise on both inter-brand and intra-brand level.
13
 Free-
riding on inter-brand level arises when an upstream firm invests in improving the quality of 
retail facilities, which benefits not only its own brands but also the brands of rivals, when they 
are sold in the same facilities. Issues with intra-brand free-riding arise on distributors‟ level. A 
distributor or retailer are often required to invest in enhancing the demand for a 
                                                          
8
 Goyder, J. EU Distribution Law, p 65.  
9
 Buettner, T., Coscelli, A., Vergé, T. and Winter, R. A.  “An Economic Analysis of the Use of Selective Distribution by Luxury 
Goods Suppliers” (2009) 5 European Competition Journal 201. (CRA Paper), sec 5(a). 
10
 See e.g. Ibid sec 48 f. 
11
 Motta, M. Competition Policy – Theory and Practice, p 334. 
12
 Paldor, I. The Vertical Restraints Paradox: Justifying the Different Legal Treatment of Price and Non-Price Vertical 
Restraints p 8. 
13
 See e.g. Slade M. The Effects of Vertical Restraints: An Evidence Based Approach p 16 f.  
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manufacturer‟s product, not only through such investments regarding brand image as 
mentioned above, but also through advertising, promotion and before- and after sales services 
for the products in question. For a distributor to make such investments it must know that it 
will regain the expenses, why it has to be protected from other distributors free-riding on its 
investments. If another retailer may sell the product without having to market the product 
itself, it can compete with a lower price, and thereby thwarting the first retailer from making a 
profit, leading to unwillingness to make future investments. 
The free-riding problem is one of the main defenses for the use of selective distribution 
systems. Without protection from free-riding it will be hard to find the right balance between 
price and services to maximise consumer welfare. The problem can be solved either through 
price- or non-price vertical restraints.
14
 Selective distribution systems solve the free-riding 
problem with making it if not impossible, so at least very difficult for unauthorised 
distributors to purchase and resell the products in question.
15
 As long as the qualification 
requirements for entering the selective distribution system are applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner, all distributors will make the necessary efforts to sell the products and thereby 
prevent others from free-riding. 
2.1.2.b Protection from Manufacturer opportunism 
Manufacturer opportunism arises when the manufacturer wants the distributor to make 
investments ex ante in order for him to provide better service to consumers.
16
 These 
investments can consist of for example human capital or special facilities. The distributor will 
not make such investments as long as it cannot be assured that its investments are fully 
protected, why it will not accept such demands from a manufacturer which has several 
unauthorised dealers marketing its products on the same market.
17
 It is both common and 
understandable that a distributor demands exclusivity to make this kind of investments and it 
is normally not considered harmful for competition. The problem is usually solved through 
exclusive or selective distribution.
18
 
2.2 Potential harms  
Selective distribution can be a threat to efficient intra- brand competition as well as leading to 
foreclosure on the distribution market.
19
 There is a risk that such systems lead to competition 
being softened and collusion between suppliers being facilitated, especially where there is a 
cumulative effect of several selective distribution systems. Reduced intra-brand competition is 
harmful only where there is limited inter-brand competition.
20
 If a big part of the suppliers of 
a certain product use selective distribution for the selling of their products, competition may 
be softened at both suppliers and distributor‟s level. Hence, it would also effect inter-brand 
competition which in turn would increase the effects of the reduced intra-brand competition.  
                                                          
14
 Telser (1960) argued that the problem should be solved through RPM, whereas Klein and Murphy (1988) held that it 
instead could be solved through non-price vertical restraints. 
15
 Kinsella, Melin and Shropp question whether selective distribution can solve the free-riding issue in  Comment on the CRA 
paper entitled  “An Economic Analysis of the Use of Selective Distribution by Luxury Goods Suppliers”, p 239. 
16
 Slade, M. The Effects of Vertical Restraints: An Evidence Based Approach in The Pros and Cons of Vertical Restraint,s p 18. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 See e.g. Vertical Guidelines para 107(a) together with para 185. 
19
 See e.g Ibid para 175. 
20
 Ibid para 177. 
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2.2.1 Foreclosure of the market 
By establishing a big selective retail network that involves most retailers, a manufacturer can 
prevent his competitors from accessing the market.
21
 If all the major retailers are tied to a 
selective network, the manufacturer‟s competitors must pay high prices for entering the 
market. If they choose to distribute their products through new retailers, those retailers must 
be built up and marketed before the products will reach a broad consumer base. If they instead 
choose to distribute the products themselves, they might have to build up a complete retail 
business from the start, which is not only risky and pricy, but also takes time in which the 
market for a certain product may already be subdued. 
Since a well working selective distribution system makes it impossible for non-authorised 
dealers to obtain supplies, the method is an efficient way of avoiding pressure by price 
discounters on the margins of the manufacturer, as well as of the authorised distributors. The 
result of such foreclosure is reduced possibilities for consumers to enjoy the benefits that can 
be brought by selective distribution systems, such as lower prices and access to a wider range 
of products.  
2.2.2 The motives affect the effects on competition  
It has been shown that the effects of vertical restraints depend on how and why the restraints 
have been imposed. Empirical studies have shown that privately imposed vertical restraints 
are very likely to benefit consumers and only harm them in a few cases.
22
 On the other hand, 
restraints that are mandated by the government do not seem to improve consumer welfare, in 
fact they are actually likely to reduce it, even when initiated by the consumers themselves.
23
 It 
is a clear tendency for consumer well being to be congruent with manufacturer profits, at least 
with respect to the voluntary adoption of vertical restraints.
24
 This also convergences with the 
above mentioned fact that privately imposed restraints often gain consumers. If they would 
not have been beneficial for the manufacturer, they would not have existed in the first place. 
This also constitutes a sign that the market has a system of regulating itself in a way that 
increases competition. 
Part III - The context of EU Competition 
Law 
1. The Foundation of EU Competition Law 
The European Union consists of 27 member states and is more than just a free trade area; it is 
a union for the people of Europe, with greater integration as a political goal. Still, the Member 
States have their own national legislation, even if a great deal of their legislative power has 
been transferred to the bodies of the EU. Community law is derived from several different 
                                                          
21
 Slade, M. The Effects of Vertical Restraints: An Evidence Based Approach, p 19. 
22
 Slade, M. The Effects of Vertical Restraints: An Evidence Based Approach in The Pros and Cons of Vertical Restraints p 22. 
23
 Ibid p 23. 
24
 Ibid. 
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sources, such as Treaties, Regulations, Case law and the general principles of EU law.  The 
European Union is based on the treaty of Rome, which later tuned into the EC Treaty and the 
EU Treaty which since December 2009 are joined together in the Treaty of the Functioning of 
the European Union, TFEU. The second section of the preamble of the TFEU states that the 
Treaty‟s main goal is „to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe‟. 
One of the main aims of the EU is market integration why the rules on free trade are 
extremely important. Article 35 TFEU (former Article 28 TEC) states that „Quantitative 
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between 
Member States.‟, whereas Article 36 TFEU (former Article 29 TEC) says the same about 
quantitative restrictions on exports. Both the Commission and the ECJ have approached a 
broad definition equivalent effect.
25
 
The provisions on free movement are applicable both to products and services originating in 
Member States as well as product and services from third countries as soon as they have been 
put in free circulation in the Member States. The definition of being put into the EU market 
has been disputed in several cases, but generally it can be said that a product is in free 
circulation once it has overcome the border and the common external tariff, which is the same 
in all Member States. 
 
The main aim for EU Competition Law is set out in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU: 
Article 3 
1. The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: 
 (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market 
 
As can be seen, EU Competition Law has a combined goal of market integration and 
undistorted competition, which distinguish it from other competition law systems. The aim for 
a single market is largely political and is not necessarily consistent with economic welfare.
26
  
The goal of market integration has historically led to a high protection of parallel trade by the 
Community Courts and the European Commission, since it is considered to have positive 
effects on competition and to thwart divergence between national or regional markets within 
the Union. Parallel trade is also a special issue in Europe due to the fact that the EU market 
constitutes almost ideal conditions for lucrative price arbitrage, even after the introduction of 
the Euro in 15 of the EU Member States in 2002. This is due to several factors, such as low 
transportation costs due to the small distances and good infrastructure, varying national price 
controls, strong demand, and a wealthy consumer market.
27
 Selective distribution systems will 
normally not thwart the integration of the European market unless combined with direct or 
indirect export bans. 
                                                          
25
 Craig, P and de Burca, G. EU Law, Texts, Cases and Materials, p 615. 
26
 Motta, M. Competition Policy – Theory and Practice, p 23. 
27
 Bird, R. C. and Chaudhry, P. E. Pharmaceuticals and the European Union, managing grey markets in an uncertain legal 
environment, p 2. 
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To be caught by EU Competition Law, an act must be covered by Article 101(1) TFEU. Even 
though Article 101(2) provides that agreements caught by Article 101(1) are automatically 
void, they may still be allowed if the exemption in 101(3) is applicable.  If it is clear that a 
conduct is of that sort mentioned in 101(3), there is no longer any need to see if all the 
conditions in Article 101(1) are fulfilled. If, on the other hand, the Commission can show that 
the agreement falls within the scope of Article 101(1) it is then for the undertakings to show 
that the exemption in Article 101(3) is applicable.
28
 
2. Historical treatment of vertical restraints 
2.1 The early years 
EU Competition Law has a tradition of treating vertical restraints very strictly. From the early 
days of the Union until the 1980‟s, the Commission and the Community Courts managed to 
build a competition law regime without direct support from the Member States.
29
 For many 
years the Commission refused to recognise that vertical restraints could be pro-competitive. 
Instead it adopted a very strict approach, where the aim for a single market clearly stood 
above economic efficiency. During this era, the Commission was inspired by the Freiburg 
school and concerned with agreements restraining the economic freedom of the parties.
30
  
The strong aim for the single market made the Commission apply Article 101(1) very widely, 
which raised a lot of criticism.
31
 Generally, the Commission was criticised for its inadequate 
economic analysis, its stubborn use of the economic freedom theory and its constant 
ignorance of court judgments with a more nuanced and approach.
32
  
The Courts, which are supposed to legally try the Commission‟s decisions on appeal, had a 
more economic approach than the Commission and ruled that agreements shall be seen in 
both an economic and in a legal context.
33
  For example, in Delimitris
34
, ECJ held that an 
agreement concerning exclusive purchasing would only fall within the scope of Article 101(1) 
if it had the effect of foreclosing market access to competitors. When having a more flexible 
approach than the Commission, the Community Courts were still criticised for favouring 
intra-brand competition over inter-brand competition and for failing to reconcile consumer 
welfare with the goal of market integration.
35
  
Until the 1990‟s, the EU Competition law protected legal certainty rather than economic 
efficiency.
36
 Although making it easier for law practitioners, the way of which the law dealt 
                                                          
28
 Council Regulation 1/2003, Article 2. 
29
 Hawk, B. E. System failure - Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law. Until the 1980’s Germany was the only member 
State which regarded the policy of competition as a serious concern. 
30
 Ibid p 977, Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. EC Competition Law, text cases and materials p 619. 
31
 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. EC Competition Law, text cases and materials p 620. 
32
 Hawk, B. E. System failure - Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law, p 922 ff. 
33
 Korah, V. and Rothie, W. Exclusive Distribution and the EEC Competition Rules, p 51. 
34
 C-234/89, Delimitris v. Henninger Brau AG (1991) ECR 935. 
35
 Hawk, B. E. System failure - Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law p 981.  
36
 Korah, V. and Rothie, W. Exclusive Distribution and the EEC Competition Rules p 32. 
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with agreements by category
37
 involved a risk of falling in between regulations as the 
principles changed but the rules were consistent.
38
 This, in combination with the 
Commission‟s wide approach of Article 101(1), imposed a heavy burden on the companies 
which would have to seek exemption or rely on conduct letters when concluding distribution 
agreements.
39
 
2.2 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in Competition Policy, 1996 
After being heavily criticised for its handling of competition law issues, the Commission 
adopted a Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in 1996. The Green Paper suggested four 
different options on how to reform the application of Article 101 (then Article 85 EC). The 
first option was to maintain the existing system, the second was to maintain the system but 
taking a more flexible approach on the then existing block exemptions. The third option was 
to  limit the existing block exemptions to agreements between undertaking with a market 
share of less than 40%, at the same time as introduce a presumption that agreements between 
undertakings with a market share of less than 20% do not infringe Article 101(1). The forth 
and last option put forward in the green Paper was to make changes to the then existing Block 
Exemption Regulations. The Green Paper was followed with intense debate leading up to a 
fifth option, namely a completely new approach to Article 101.
40
 In 1999, the new Vertical 
Block Exemption Regulation, followed by new Vertical Guidelines, showed a more economic 
approach on vertical restraints, focusing on the effect on competition rather than the kind of 
the agreement.  
2.3 Modernisation Regulation and the assessment of vertical restraints 
The Modernisation Regulation
41
 entered into force in 2004, stating that agreements fulfilling 
the criteria for exemption no longer need to be tested against Article 101(1). The change has 
improved the efficiency in the dealing with Article 101 for both the Commission and 
businesses, although, it has also created some confusion and uncertainty as it turned the 
exemption into somewhat more of an exception. The Regulation also withdrew the 
notification procedure
42
, making it for the companies themselves to decide whether they 
would benefit from the exemption or not, with high prices to pay if making the wrong 
judgment.  
Even though the approach of both the Commission and the Community Courts has been made 
more flexible since the late 1990‟s, the EU Competition law is still quite extensive when it 
comes to regulating distribution agreements.  
                                                          
37
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3. The current legislation 
There are several regulations and guidelines on how to interpret and apply Article 101. The 
two major acts of this text are the newly renewed Vertical Block Exemption Regulation,
43
 
which exempts a big number of agreements under 101(3) without all requirements in the 
statue needing to be tested, and the accompanying Vertical Guidelines.
44
  
When the VBER is a binding legal act directly applicable in all Member States, the Vertical 
Guidelines are non-binding papers where the Commission aims to help companies assess 
whether their distribution agreements are in accordance with the EU Competition rules. The 
Guidelines are in fact not law, but have many similar effects with legislative acts since they 
are followed by the Commission. Further, market actors normally follow the Guidelines, since 
they can count on the Commission to take actions according to them. It is to be acknowledged 
that national authorities or the European Courts are able to grant actions of companies, also 
when they are not in accordance with the Guidelines.
45
  
3.1 Article 101(1) TFEU 
Article 101(1) is the entrance for most competition law cases and essentially prohibits 
restrictions on competition originating from non-unilateral conduct. It thus prohibits a wide 
range of both vertical and horizontal anti-competitive agreements and practices between 
undertakings.  
The Article reads as follows: 
 
“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.” 
 
As can be seen, the article does not expressly address vertical agreements. However, already 
in 1966, the ECJ made clear that the rule applies on agreements between non competing 
                                                          
43
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undertakings on different level of trade, since such agreements may affect trade between 
Member States.
46
  
When deciding if Article 101(1) is applicable in a certain case, there are three important 
things to examine: 
1. Is there an agreement between undertakings? 
2. Does the agreement have any actual or potential appreciable effect on trade between 
Member States?  
3. Has the agreement as its object or effect to restrict competition?  
3.1.1. Agreement between undertakings 
The first requirement for a conduct to be caught by Article 101(1) is that it is an agreement 
between undertakings.  For an agreement to be at hand, it is necessary that there is an 
expression of a joint intention to a certain market behavior.
47
 What form the expression takes 
does not matter as long as it is clear and faithful. In the absence of an explicit agreement, it is 
for the Commission to prove that the anti competitive behavior of one party is adopted with 
the acquiescence of the other party.
48
 The Commission must also show that there is an 
existing concurrence of wills and not a matter of unilateral conduct. In AEG Telefunken v 
Commission
49
, AEG adopted a selective distribution system where it refused to approve 
retailers operation on low margins. The ECJ referred to the special nature of selective 
distribution and stated that refusals of approval of new distributors are part of the contractual 
relations with the authorised distributors and may therefore be caught by Article 101(1).
50
  
When determining whether or not a body is an undertaking, the assessment shall be based on 
economic considerations rather than strict legal ones.  In Höfner and Elsner vs Macrotron 
GmbH
51
 the ECJ stated that the conception of undertaking includes “every entity engaged in 
an economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way it‟s financed”.52   
Article 101 is not applicable on agreements between undertakings that form a single economic 
entity. Companies can therefore avoid competition issues related to distribution by having 
wholly or partly owned subsidiaries, which do not enjoy autonomy, to undertake their 
distribution.  A subsidiary is part of a single entity in absence of “real freedom to determine it 
course of action on the market”.53 Absence of freedom is presumed for majority 
shareholdings, but this assumption may be overturned if the subsidiary has a strong influence 
on its own management and business plans.
54
 Internal group practice may still be caught by 
Article 102 TFEU, regarding abuse of dominance, if the undertaking has a dominant position 
on the relevant market. 
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3.1.1.a Agency 
Agency is a special form of distribution agreement, where the agent is acting as a conduit 
between the principals and the buyer, without negotiating the contract himself or taking any 
major financial risk. If an agreement is classified as a true agency, Article 101(1) is not 
applicable since it is a matter of unilateral conduct. Whether an agreement is a true agency 
agreement or not is determined on de facto basis rather than the parties labeling and an agent 
can be considered to be an own entity if he has got enough autonomy and take own risks.
55
  
3.1.2 Actual or potential effect on trade between Member States 
For an agreement to be caught by Article 101(1) is has to have at least a potential effect on 
trade between Member States. In a classic case from 1966 ECJ stated that: 
„For this requirement to be fulfilled it must be possible to  foresee with a sufficient degree of 
probability on the basis of  a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement  in 
question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual  or potential, on the pattern of trade 
between Member States.‟56 
In its ruling in Consten and Grundig
57
, which came shortly after the judgment cited above, the 
ECJ stressed that in making the assessment whether an agreement has effect on trade between 
Member States, it is important to determine the capacity of the agreement to threaten the 
freedom of interstate trade in a way which would undermine the single market objective. This 
capacity could be actual or potential, direct or indirect.
58
 
The European Commission gives some guidance to when an agreement shall be considered to 
fall outside the scope of EU Competition Law because of lacking effect on trade. According 
to the Commission it is rare for agreements between small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) to have appreciable effect on trade between Member States or being able to 
appreciably restrict competition.
59
 An undertaking is considered an SME when it has 
maximum 250 employees, a turnover below 50 million EUR and a balance sheet of less than 
43 million EUR.
60
 However, if at least one of the parties of an agreement holds a dominant 
position in a substantial part of the EU the agreement can still be considered as having 
appreciable effect.
61
  
According to the Commission‟s Notice, no appreciable effect on Member States arises if the 
aggregate market share of the parties is below 5% and the parties‟ turnover in the EU is below 
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40 million EUR.
62
 Moreover, some agreements fall outside of Article 101 TFEU since they 
are covered by the de minimis Notice.
63
 
3.1.2.a Appriciable effect -  de minimis doctrine 
Agreements between undertakings with small market shares fall outside the scope of Article 
101. De minimis Notice says that if the parties in an agreement are actual or potential 
competitors and have less than 10 % of the market share, or are not competitors and have less 
than 15 % of the market share, the agreement falls outside the scope of Article 101 since it is 
not considered to have effect on trade between Member States.
64
 In case of existing parallel 
networks, this threshold is set to 5% regardless of whether or not the parties are competitors.
65
 
There are however some limitations of the Notice and the ECJ has stated that it is not accurate 
to approach a strictly quantitative approach to de minimis.
66
  For example, it is necessary to 
take into consideration the saturation of the market as well as the customers loyalty to existing 
brands.
67
 The Notice excepts some hardcore provisions from de minimis. The hardcore 
restrictions include export bans, price-fixing, market sharing agreements, resale price 
maintenance and certain territorial restrictions
68
 and may be caught by Article 101, as long as 
the agreement is to be ruled by EU Competition Law.   
3.1.2.b  Territorial reach of Art 101 
The requirement that agreements must have an effect on trade between the EU Member States 
does not mean that the agreement in question has to be concluded of European undertakings. 
Even if two non-EU undertakings enter into an agreement outside the Union, it can still be 
caught by Article 101 if it is wholly or partly implemented within the EU.
69
 In Javico 
International & Another v. Yves Saint Laurent Perfums SA
 70
, the ECJ held that an export ban, 
which was imposed on distributors in Russia and the Ukraine, had an effect on trade between 
Member States. 
3.1.3 Object or effect to restrict competition 
To be caught by Article 101(1), an agreement must have as its actual or potential object or 
effect the restriction of competition. An agreement which has an anti-competitive object are 
considered caught by Article 101(1) per se, regardless of the actual effects it has on 
competition. Since such an agreement normally does not bring such efficiencies with it that 
the anti-competitive purpose is outbalanced it will usually not benefit from the exemption in 
Article 101(3).
71
 In order to establish whether an agreement has as it object to affect 
competition negatively there are several factors to take into consideration, such as the 
provisions in the agreement, the economic background of the agreement and the conduct of 
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the parties to the agreement.
72
 Even if the restriction of competition is not the sole aim of an 
agreement, it may still be considered having an anti-competitive object.
73
 Regarding export 
bans, the ECJ has held that an agreement is considered as having an anti-competitive 
objective even if the export restrictions are an indirect result of another provision, rather than 
that of a direct action.
74
  
If an actual or potential object to upset competition cannot be established, the effects of the 
agreement will be examined.
75
 If an agreement is found to either actually or potentially affect 
competition negatively, it is likely to fall within Article 101(1) and sufficient 
counterbalancing effects must be shown for the exemption in Article 101(3) to be applicable. 
 
As can be seen, the scope of Art 101(1) is quite extensive. It is enough for an agreement, 
which has not as its objective to restrain competition, to have a potential indirect effect on 
trade between Member States for it to be caught under the EU Competition rules. As a result, 
many vertical agreements fall within the scope of the article. However, many of those benefit 
from the exemption in 101(3), either through an individual assessment or because they are 
within the „safe harbour‟ of the VBER. 
3.2 The exemption in Article 101(3) TFEU 
Article 101(3)  
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and 
which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question.  
 
Compared to many provisions in the TFEU, Article 101(3) is relatively clear in its definition 
of the criteria for its appliance, although it is hardly uncomplicated to apply. 
First of all, the agreement in question shall provide efficiency gains and contribute to 
improvement of production and distribution. Further, the agreement shall be indispensible for 
efficiency, which does not mean that it has to be the only or even the main purpose of the 
agreement, but that there has to be a link between the efficiency and the agreement in 
question.
76
 Thirdly, a fair share of the results and benefits should reach the consumers. Thus, 
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it is not sufficient to prove that the agreement gains society as a whole, but the consumers 
must end up in a better position than if the contract had not been concluded. The provision 
suggests that consumer welfare is one of the ultimate objectives in EU Competition Law, a 
view which is also shown in the Vertical Guidelines where the Commission holds that the 
objective of Article 101 is to ensure that undertakings do not conclude anti-competitive 
agreements to the detriment of consumers.
77
 
Forth, the agreements shall not eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question. It is for the undertaking claiming the benefit of Article 101(3) to proof 
that the criteria set out in this article are fulfilled.
78
   
As has been mentioned, there is no longer necessary to examine whether an agreement falls 
foul of 101(1) if the conditions in 101(3) are met. This is especially significant for agreements 
that benefit from the VBER.  
3.3 The Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 
The Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, exempts all agreements, or parts thereof, covered 
by it from the application of Article 101(1), as they are said to automatically be benefitting 
from Article 101(3).
79
 It is for the undertakings themselves to decide whether or not their 
agreement is covered by the Regulation.
80
 
3.3.1 The Scope of the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption 
The VBER covers vertical agreements between undertakings where the market share held by 
the supplier does not exceed 30 % of the relevant selling market and the market share of the 
buyer does not exceed 30 % of the relevant buying market, to the extent such agreements 
regard vertical restraints.
81
 In the former VBER the focus was on the suppliers‟ market share, 
except for agreements regarding exclusive supply, but the increasing acknowledgement of 
buyer power has led to a change on this point. 
According to Article 2(4) VBER, vertical agreements entered into between competing 
undertakings fall outside the scope of the regulation and are instead to be reviewed under the 
Horizontal Guidelines
82
 before the vertical effects are to be reviewed. There are, however, 
some exceptions to this rule. The VBER still applies where competing undertakings enter into 
a non-reciprocal vertical agreement and at least one of the following requirements is fulfilled: 
 the supplier is both a manufacturer and a distributor of goods, whereas the buyer is 
a distributor and do not compete with the supplier at the manufacturing level. 
 
 the supplier provides services at several levels of trade, whereas the buyer is a 
provider of  goods or services at retail level and does not compete at the level of 
trade where it purchases the services concerned.  
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3.3.2   Market Share Threshold 
When calculating an undertaking's market share, it is necessary to determine the relevant 
market where that undertaking sells respectively purchases the contract products. How this is 
to be calculated is explained in the Commission Notice on Market Definition.
83
 Market 
definition has both a product- and a geographical dimension. The relevant product market 
consists of all products and/or services which the consumer regards as interchangeable or 
substitutable due to their characteristics, their prices and their intended use.
84
 The relevant 
geographic market comprises the area in which the firms concerned are involved in the supply 
of products or services and in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous where it can be distinguished from neighbouring geographic areas due to 
appreciably different conditions of competition. 
3.3.2.a Product market dimension 
Demand substitutability is the essence of market definition.
85
  One way of determine to which 
consent a consumer would be prepared to switch between products is through the SSNIP-
test.
86
 The test is based on price-elasticity. It takes the view of a hypothetical monopolist and 
examines whether a small increase in price, normally 5-10%
87
, would be profitable or if 
marginal consumers instead would choose to move to other products. If this increase in price 
would make customers choose another product, that product is considered interchangeable 
with the product of the hypothetical monopolist. 
 
The product dimension may also be based on supply side substitutability. Products between 
which a supplier is able to switch production in a short time and at insignificant additional 
costs are regarded as interchangeable, even if they are not exchangeable for the consumer. 
3.3.2.b Geographical market dimension 
The geographical dimension examines how far is a buyer prepared to travel to pursue the 
product. In the assessment the nature of the products due to transport costs and local and 
national preferences as well as market integration must be taken into consideration. The 
SSNIP test can be applied to geographical markets by examining the customers‟ willingness 
to switch to a supplier further away due to a small increase in price by their local retailer.  
The geographic wholesale market is usually wider than the retail market, since distributors are 
professional buyers unlike the final consumers. The geographical wholesale markets are often 
considered to be a whole Member State or even wider.
88
  
Regarding multi party agreements, an undertaking buying from one party and selling to 
another must respect its market share both as a supplier and a buyer when applying the 
VBER.
89
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3.3.3 Hardcore restrictions that remove the benefit of the Block Exemption, Article 4 
VBER. 
There are certain restrictions, that, once part of an agreement, completely excludes the whole 
agreement from benefitting from the Block Exemption. There is still a possibility that the 
agreement will be exempted after an individual examination of 101(3), although this is not 
likely to happen.
90
 The hardcore restrictions are laid down in Article 4 of the VBER and 
include agreements which have as their object to either restrict resale prices or to restrict the 
territories and/or customers from/to the buyer can resell the goods or services. The hardcore 
restrictions regarding selective distribution are to be found in Article 4b(ii, iii and iv), (c), (d) 
and (e) and will be discussed below. 
3.3.4 Individual cases of hardcore sales restrictions that may fall outside the scope of 
Article 101(1) or may fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3)  
There are situations where hardcore restrictions may be objectively necessary and therefore 
fall outside the scope of Article 101(1). This appears only under exceptional circumstances, 
such as when a restriction is necessary to ensure the respect of a public ban on selling 
dangerous substances. 
It is also possible for undertakings to plead an efficiency defense under Article 101(3) and 
thereby be exempted from Article 101(1), even when the restriction is considered hardcore. 
Such defense is most likely to succeed where the distributor is the first to sell a new brand or 
to enter a new market with an existing brand, since this often require substantial 
investments.
91
 The distributor may be protected from both active and passive sales for a 
limited period of time up to two years.  
3.3.5 Withdrawal of the VBER 
The VBER creates a safe harbour for parties of the agreements covered by it. However, the 
presumption of legality conferred by the Block Exemption Regulation may be withdrawn 
where a vertical agreement is within the scope of Article 101(1) without fulfilling the criteria 
in 101(3).
92
 The agreement does not have to have such effect in itself; it is enough that the 
effect is reached together with similar agreements enforced by competing suppliers or 
buyers.
93
  
The VBER may only be withdrawn for undertakings which make an appreciable contribution 
to the anti-competitive cumulative effect. If the effect of a certain agreement is not 
appreciable it does not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) at all.  It is for the Commission 
to proof that the agreement falls within Article 101(1) and that it does not meet the criteria in 
101(3).
94
 Thus, with regards to the burden of proof, there is some extra protection provided 
for agreements that fall within VBER, compared to those which are not covered by the safe 
harbour. In the latter case it is for the contracting parties to prove that the agreement fulfils the 
criteria in Article 101(3) and therefore shall benefit from the exemption.  
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It is also possible for the competition authority of a Member State to withdraw the benefit of 
VBER where the anti-competitive effects of the agreement affect that state, or a distinct 
geographical market thereof.
95
  
A decision about withdrawal only affects the status of the agreement from the date the 
decision becomes effective.
96
 
3.4 Consequences of infringing Article 101 
There are three legal consequences of infringing Article 101. First of all, the agreement or 
practice in question is void and is therefore not enforceable.
97
 If the offending part can be 
separated from the rest of the agreement, the remaining part of the agreement will still stand.
98
 
If, on the other hand, a separation is not possible, the whole agreement will be void.
99
  
 
Second, the Commission can impose penalty fines up to 10 % of the parties‟ annual turnover 
worldwide,
100
 which means that an infringement can be very expensive. The largest fine so far 
imposed for a vertical agreement was in Nintendo Distribution
101
 for the prevention of parallel 
trade. The Commission imposed a fine of a total EUR 167.8 million on the manufacturer and 
its distributors, out of which EUR 149 million was imposed on Nintendo alone, for being the 
driving force behind the behavior and also for continuing with the infringement after being 
notified of the investigation.
102
 Nintendo and its distributors appealed the case to the General 
Court, which reduced the fines to a total EUR 119.2425 million.
103
 
 
Finally, third parties affected by the anti competitive conduct may sue for damages, which is 
encouraged by the Commission.
104
  
4. Article 102 TFEU – Abuse of dominant position 
Where vertical restrictions are seen as unilateral conduct rather than an agreement between 
undertakings, they do not fall within Article 101, but may still be caught by Article 102 TFEU 
if the imposing part has a dominant position on the market in question. Article 102 prohibits a 
dominant undertaking, or a number of jointly dominant undertakings, to abuse their market 
strength. The test of dominance is whether the entity is in a position to behave “to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its 
consumers”.105 However, market share has traditionally been and consists to be the main 
measurement in the assessment
106
 even if other factors such as position of competitors and 
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structure of the market are to be examined.
107
 Since selective distribution is normally based on 
agreements between two or more parties it is usually covered by Article 101 rather than 
Article 102.
108
 
 
Part IV - Selective distribution in EU 
Law 
Selective distribution, especially when qualitative, is normally not considered hazardous for 
competition. The Vertical Guidelines state that even though selective distribution can be 
harmful for intra-brand competition, have foreclosing effects on distributor‟s level, and soften 
competition and facilitate collusion between suppliers and buyers, it is generally exempted by 
the VBER, due to its pro competitive effects.
109
 This applies even when selective distribution 
is combined with other non-hard core vertical restraints. Although, when combined with 
exclusive distribution, selective distribution is considered a hardcore restraint and will only be 
exempted if active selling into other territories is allowed.
110
 If a selective distribution 
agreement does not benefit from the VBER, it might still be exempted by Article 101(3), 
especially where there is strong inter-brand competition on the market in question.
111
  
1. Selective distribution within the context of Article 101(1) 
When making the assessment whether or not an agreement infringes Article 101(1) it is 
necessary to make a distinction between purely qualitative selective distribution and 
quantitative selective distribution.
112
 
1.1 Purely Qualitative Selective Distribution Agreements 
As long as a selective distribution system is purely qualitative, it will not infringe Article 
101(1), due to lacking anti-competitive effects.
113
 In Metro v. Commission
114
(Metro), the ECJ 
stated that selective distribution may be adapted for high quality and technically advanced 
products, where the distributors are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of qualitative 
nature relating to their technical qualifications and the suitability of their trading premises. 
Such conditions must not be applied in a discriminatory manner, but be laid down uniformly 
for all potential distributors.
115
 The Metro test was used in L‟Oréal v. De Nieuwe116, where the 
Court also stated that a selective distribution system is in conformity with Article 101(1) (then 
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85(1)), where such a system is necessary to preserve the quality of the products as well as 
ensure their proper use.
117
 
1.1.1 The Metro Doctrine 
In Metro, a manufacturer of televisions, radios and tape-recorders, SABA, distributed its 
products through a selective distribution system. Metro was a self-service dealer which 
appealed to the ECJ after being denied access to SABA‟s distribution network. The 
Commission had accepted SABA‟s distribution system by holding parts of it outside Article 
101(1) and fit in the rest under the exemption in 101(3), a decision that was challenged by 
Metro. In its judgment, the ECJ stated that three criteria must be satisfied for a selective 
distribution system to be treated as purely qualitative and thereby fall outside the scope of 
Article 101(1). First of all, the product in question must be of such nature that it necessitates 
selective distribution. The judgments of the Community Courts and the decisions of the 
Commission show three different categories of goods that may be included. First there are the 
technical complex products, such as cars
118
, cameras
119
, computers
120
 and clocks and 
watches
121
, that requires specialist sales staff and after sales services. However, all such 
products are not included. For example in ETA Fabriques d‟Ebauches SA v. DK Investment 
SA regarding an export ban, the ECJ questioned whether mass-produced watches were of such 
nature that it would justify selective distribution.
122
 The second category of goods which may 
fall within the Metro-doctrine is products which brand image is of major importance, like 
perfumes and luxury cosmetics
123
, diner services
124
 and gold and silver jewellery
125
. Here it is 
necessary to assess the need for the producer to preserve the image of its brand as well as the 
need to safeguard the image of exclusivity and prestige of the product.
126
 The third and final 
category of products is newspapers and periodicals; since their distribution is extremely 
important due to the extremely limited time, those products can be sold by the retailer.
127
 
Even if the product in question is included in one of the categories above, it might be 
problematic for a supplier to argue that a product is of such type that it necessitates selective 
distribution if selective distribution systems are used in some, but not all jurisdictions.
128
  
The second criteria in the doctrine is that the supplier only have the right to limit its resellers 
based on purely qualitative criteria, laid down uniformly and applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner. In AEG Telefunken v Commission
129, AEG‟s selective distribution system where the 
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company refused to approve retailers operation on low margins, was not considered as purely 
qualitative and was therefore caught by Article 101(1).  
As mentioned above, qualitative requirements may concern suitably trained staff, suitable 
premises in an appropriate area, a shop with a proper name and the provision of sufficient 
after sales services.  The supplier is also allowed to prevent its dealers from selling to non-
authorized distributors and retailers. The key to determine whether or not a requirement is 
purely qualitative seems to be that qualitative criteria are those aiming to select dealers due to 
their objective suitability to distribute the particular type of goods, whereas quantitative more 
directly limit the potential number of dealers.
130
 Borderline issues are for example the holding 
of minimum stocks, minimum turnover or the percentage of minimal turnover.
131
 Such 
provisions have often been regarded as quantitative and therefore fallen within the scope of 
Article 101(1), although not consistently. Jones and Sufrin assert that the Courts‟ judgments 
and the Commission‟s decisions indicate that the classification of the obligation may depend 
on the nature of the product in question.
132
 Even if a provision should be regarded as 
quantitative and therefore not avoid Article 101(1), it may still have good chances to benefit 
from the exemption in 101(3).
133
  
Guidance can be sought in the following cases and decisions: 
In Vichy
134, the producer‟s restriction of its sales to include only officially appointed 
pharmacies, was found to be a quantitative rather than qualitative restriction since the 
requirement of being a dispensing chemist was considered necessary for the cosmetic 
products in question. 
In Yves Saint Laurent, the distribution agreements included provisions on minimal annual 
purchase figures, obligations of the carrying of stocks, stock rotation and cooperation in 
advertising and promotion. The Commission found the agreements to fall within the scope of 
Article 101(1).
135
 
Finally, for an agreement to fulfill the criteria in the Metro Doctrine and thereby avoid being 
caught by Article 101(1), it must be proportional. Thus, it may not include any provisions that 
go further than objectively necessary to protect the quality of the product in question. In 
Hasselblad
136
, the Commission found that the producer went too far when maintaining the 
right to exercise supervision of the advertising of its distributors and retailers.  
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In Grohe
137
 and Ideal Standard
138
, the Commission found that provisions requiring 
wholesalers to resell only to plumbing contractors were infringements of Article 101(1). The 
laws of the Member States require major plumbing work to be performed only by official 
plumbers and it was therefore not necessary for producers to control the quality of such work. 
1.2 Selective Distribution Systems that are not purely Qualitative  
Selective distribution systems including quantitative restrictions are likely be caught by 
Article 101(1). However, such systems are often exempted by Article 101(3), either through 
the VBER or through individual assessment. The VBER exempts both qualitative and 
quantitative selective distribution systems where the parties of the agreement are within the 
30% threshold.
139
 
Since the loss of intra-brand competition only harms competition when inter-brand 
competition is weak, the Commission will examine the market position of the supplier and its 
competitors when making the assessment whether a selective distribution system infringes 
Article 101(1).
140
 Further, it will look at the number if selective distribution systems operating 
on the same market, since this may affect the market access for certain distributors.  
As been said, there are situations where a quantitative selective distribution system can be 
approved.  In Omega
141
, the Commission approved of a distribution system where Omega did 
not only require that their distributors satisfied qualitative conditions, but also limited the 
number of retailers per town or suburb based on the local population and presumed wealth. 
The system was not regarded as anti-competitive since Omega watches are manufactured in 
limited numbers and the quantitative restrictions ensured that each retailer has a turnover big 
enough to invest in the promotion of the watches.  
2. Selective distribution within the context of Article 101(3) 
2.1 Selective distribution in the VBER 
Selective distribution is normally not considered a hardcore restraint and can therefore benefit 
from the VBER even if combined with other non-hardcore restraints.
142
 However, selective 
distribution agreements may not be combined with agreements on exclusive distribution 
unless both active and passive sales are allowed within the system.
143
 
2.1.1 Territorial restrictions 
Article 4(b) of the VBER says that a supplier may not restrict the territory into which or the 
customer group to whom the distributor sell the products in question, although it may still 
make restrictions as to the distributors‟ place of establishment. However, there are some 
further exceptions to this rule. 
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First of all, it is possible to prevent a wholesaler from selling to end users, so that the 
wholesale and retail level of trade can be kept separate.
144
 The wholesaler shall still have the 
right to sell to certain end users, such as “big” end users.145 
It is also possible to restrict members of a selective distribution system from selling to 
unauthorised distributors, as long as the restrictions stay within the territory reserved by the 
supplier to operate the system.
146
 It has here been a change from the former VBER, where it 
was generally permitted to restrict sales to all unauthorised distributors, regardless of on 
which market they operated. After some complaints on the wording in the drafted 
Guidelines,
147
 which referred to territories where selective distribution systems are operated, 
rather than territories reserved by the supplier, it is now clear that authorised distributors do 
not have the right to sell the products to unauthorised dealers in territories where the supplier 
is yet to put the product on the market. The drafted wording would have put smaller suppliers 
in a tough position, since they might have the aim or means to sell their products in all 
Member States.
148
   
The new limitation of the suppliers‟ rights has been criticised for creating practical problems 
where a supplier decides that selective distribution not is the appropriate distribution model 
for all markets within the Union.
149
 If a supplier applies a selective distribution system in 
some, but not all, EU markets, it will be problematic to prevent distributors in markets 
without such system from reselling the products to unauthorised distributors in markets where 
a selective distribution system is adopted. Although affecting all kinds of suppliers, the new 
wording is especially regretful for small suppliers which may not be able to operate a 
selective distribution system in all Member States.
150
 If such reselling cannot be prevented, 
the whole selective distribution system is at risk.
151
 It has been suggested that the restriction 
of sales to non-authorised distributors always should be considered legitimate within a 
selective distribution system, regardless of where the non-authorised distributor is situated, as 
it is necessary for the functioning of a selective distribution system.
152
 The current wording 
may lead to an extended use of selective distribution systems, even on markets where other 
alternatives might be at hand.
153
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2.1.2 Restriction of sales to end users 
Article 4(c) of the VBER provides that the restriction of both active and passive sales to end 
users by members of a selective distribution system operating at the retail level of trade is 
considered a hardcore restraint. However, it is still possible to for the seller to restrict the 
retailer from operating out of an unauthorised place of establishment. The provision means 
that members of a selective distribution system cannot be restricted in the customers to whom 
they sell. The Guidelines stress that the dealers within a selective distribution system shall be 
free to sell, both actively and passively, offline or on the Internet, to all end users.
154
  
2.1.3 Restriction of cross-supplies 
Furthermore, it is not allowed to restrict cross-supplies between the authorised distributors 
within a selective distribution system. The distributors must remain free to purchase the 
contracted products from other dealers within the system, whether they operate on the same or 
a different level of trade.
155
 Since the appointed distributors cannot be required to purchase 
the products from a certain source, selective distribution cannot be combined with exclusive 
purchasing agreements.
156
 It also means that no restrictions may be imposed on appointed 
wholesalers as regards their sales of the product to appointed retailers within the selective 
distribution network, a wholesaler in one EU Member State is allowed to distribute goods to 
appointed retailers all over the Union. 
 
The provision encourages trade between distributors in different Member States and thereby 
benefits the single market imperative. If a supplier facilitates price discrimination and sell to 
different prices to different distributors, the distributors may engage in arbitrage and purchase 
from one another. The prohibition covers both direct and indirect restrictions,
157
 meaning that 
a supplier may not restrict its supply to the specific amount a distributor is supposed to sell in 
its own market.  
2.1.4 Restriction of sales to certain competitors 
According to Article 5(1)(c) VBER, the supplier may not directly or indirectly oblige its 
distributors not to sell the products of certain competitors of the supplier. Such a restriction 
would not make the exemption inapplicable on the whole agreement, but just on the specific 
provision. A provision restricting sales to certain competitors is unlikely to be exempted 
through an individual assessment where the market share of the five largest suppliers (CR5) is 
50% or more, as long as the supplier in the agreement is one of those five undertakings. When 
the restrictions concern all other suppliers it is instead a matter of single branding, which in 
combination with selective distribution is exempted as long as the authorised distributors may 
sell actively and freely to each other and to end users.
158
 
2.1.5 Withdrawal of the benefit of the VBER for selective distribution agreements 
Where a supplier imposes a selective distribution system for products that do not require it, or 
implies certain criteria not necessary due to the characteristics of the products, the benefit of 
                                                          
154
 Vertical Guidelines paras 52 and 176 together.  
155
 VBER Article 4(d). 
156
 Vertical Guidelines para 58. 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Ibid para 176. 
30 
 
the VBER is likely to be withdrawn since the reduction of intra-brand competition generally 
will not be counterbalanced by sufficient efficiency gains.
159
  Such criteria could be the 
requirement for distributors to provide specific pre- or after sale services. It could also be to 
demand the distributor to have one or more brick and mortar shops for goods that need not to 
be seen in real life and therefore do not need to be sold offline.
160
 As has been said above; 
where the benefit from the VBER is withdrawn it is for the Commission to prove that the 
agreement in question does not benefit from the exemption in Article 101(3) through an 
individual assessment. 
2.2 Selective distribution above the 30 % threshold 
When making an individual assessment whether an agreement that does not benefit from the 
VBER fulfill the criteria in Article 101(3), the market power of the supplier is highly 
relevant.
161
 As long as inter-brand competition is strong, a reduction of intra-brand 
competition will not be harmful, but if the supplier has a strong market position the agreement 
must bring some real efficiency with it to balance out the loss of intra-brand competition for 
Article 101(3) to be applicable.  
Not only the market power of the supplier matters, but also the number of selective 
distribution networks present in the same market.
162
 If only one of the suppliers on the market 
uses a selective distribution system, there is little risk that a quantitative selective distribution 
system would hurt competition, provided that the nature of the contracted goods is of such art 
that the use of a selective distribution system is required and it only applies to a necessary 
extent to ensure efficient distribution.  
However, normally there are several different selective distribution systems on one market, 
why most quantitative selective distribution systems are considered to be a threat to 
competition. In Metro II
163
 the ECJ held that Article 101(1) may apply also to purely 
qualitative selective distribution agreements, where such big part of the market is covered by 
selective distribution systems that there is no room left for alternative distribution models. 
The case concerned the same parties as in Metro I and regarded the renewal of SABA‟s grants 
for exemption of their selective distribution system Just like the time before, the Commission 
approved the exemptions, but Metro claimed that this was wrongful since the market structure 
had changed so dramatically since the last decision. The number of selective distribution 
systems operated by the major producers had increased significantly on the markets 
throughout the community, leading to a foreclosure of non authorised distributors.
164
  The 
Court ruled against Metro saying that it had failed to show that the number of distribution 
system had increased in such a way that it left no room for alternative distribution 
arrangements. At the same time, the Court stated that when there is no longer any room for 
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alternative distribution methods, even pure qualitative distribution systems may be caught by 
Article 101(1).
165
  
According to the Guidelines, situations where parallel distribution networks create cumulative 
anti-competitive effects may lead to a withdrawal of the benefit of the VBER, which means 
that undertakings always have to be observant of such factors when deciding how to structure 
their distribution, even when their market share is below 30%.
166
 This may for example occur 
where some suppliers apply purely qualitative systems, whereas others also have quantity 
requirements in their selective distribution systems.
167
 However, this is unlikely to take place 
when less than 50% of the market is covered by selective distribution networks. Even if the 
networks cover more than 50%, there should normally not create any problems as long as the 
aggregate market share of the CR5 is below 50%. If the market is of the kind that more than 
50% of it is covered by selective distribution networks and also more than 50% is shared 
between the CR5, it might create problems. The result of such an assessment depends mostly 
on whether or not all CR5 make use of exclusive distribution systems. If not, it might still not 
be harmful for competition and the benefit of the VBER will not be withdrawn. 
The position of the competitors also plays a significant role. If the competitors are strong, the 
inter-brand competition is normally good and the reduction in intra-brand competition will not 
be harmful.
168
 On the other hand, if there are only a few big competitors on the market, and 
the majority of them use a selective distribution system, intra-brand competition will be 
reduced. It may also lead to foreclosure of some distributors, since non-authorised dealers are 
excluded, especially where the suppliers use the same dealers to a high extent. Further there is 
a risk of collusion between the big suppliers.  
Finally it is important to consider the maturity of the market. If the market is lively, with 
changing market positions and technologies, the loss of intra- brand competition will not have 
such damaging effect. On the other hand, if the market is mature and very stabile, it may 
create serious problems, since there is less room for new players to enter.
169
 
2.2.1 Efficiencies 
For an agreement to benefit from Article 101(3), it must bring with it efficiencies that 
outweigh the possible anti-competitive effects. Selective distribution is especially likely to 
lead to efficiencies where the distributors must invest to protect or build up the brand image, 
as with new products, complex products and so-called experience products (products whose 
qualities are difficult to judge before consumption) or credence products, whose qualities are 
hard to evaluate even after consumption. 
Where a selective distribution system includes both wholesalers and retailers, there might be a 
need for the appointed wholesalers in different territories to invest in promotional activities to 
support the appointed retailers within „their‟ own territory.  Such promotional activities may 
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be specified in a contract, but when this is not efficient, agreements where the wholesalers are 
restricted from active sales to appointed retailers in other wholesalers' territories, may solve 
the free-riding problem and therefore benefit from Article 101(3).
170
  
3. Export bans in selective distribution agreements 
Free trade and integration are primary goals for the European Union. Hence, any restraints 
hindering trade between member states are villous, why export bans in vertical agreements 
will be held to infringe Article 101(1) and are unlikely to be exempted by Article 101(3).
171
 
As will be seen, agreements constituting export bans are considered anti-competitive by 
object, which in principle leads to a per se prohibition of such provisions. This approach 
shows the political influence on European Competition Law and has been criticised for the 
lacking of economic rationale.
172
 
3.1 Direct export bans 
Selective distribution systems where the distributors are directly prohibited from exporting 
goods are considered to have as their object to restrict competition without any need to 
demonstrate anti-competitive effects.
173
   
In Nintendo Distribution
174
, Nintendo obliged its distributors to prevent parallel trade and the 
contracting parties collaborated to find the source of any such behavior. The purpose was to 
maintain the significant price differences in the EU, with the UK market up to 65% cheaper 
than Germany and the Netherlands. Traders which allowed parallel export were punished 
through smaller supplies or completely boycotted. The undertakings involved were punished 
through high fines for the breach against Article 101(1). The size of the fines imposed was set 
to reflect the real impact the offending conduct of each firm had on competition as well as the 
size of the firms.  The fines were then reduced due to co-operation with the Commission in 
the later stages of the investigation. 
In Volkswagen v. Commission
175
, the parent company of the Volkswagen group (Volkswagen 
AG) owned 98,99% holding of Audi AG and 100% of Volkswagen‟s and Audis importer for 
Italy, Autogerma SpA. The three companies had, together with their Italian dealers, concluded 
agreements creating an export ban.  
The contracts included penalties on Italian dealers selling outside the country. Bonuses were 
in principle only paid for the sales the distributors conducted within their territory and the cars 
even had to be registered within the territory for the sale to be put to the base of the bonus. 
Further, the agreements prohibited cross-deliveries to authorised dealers in other Member 
States. The Italian dealer also only received the number of cars necessary to supply customers 
in their own territory. The result was that customers from other Member States were kept 
from the possibility to buy the cars from Italy. The export bans were considered parts of the 
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distribution agreements since the dealers followed the given instructions. The Commission 
held them to be hardcore restrictions, not to be exempted by the Regulation that exempted 
agreements from what then was Article 85(3).
176
 The General Court agreed with these 
findings on appeal, even if disagreeing with a few other part of the decision.
177
 Its ruling was 
then confirmed by the ECJ. 
3.2 Indirect export bans 
Just like direct export bans, indirect measures that will have the same effect as export bans are 
also black-listed in the VBER.
178
  There are a number of ways in which a supplier may 
prevent its distributors from exporting contracted goods. It can set different prices on products 
to be exported or withdraw a buyer‟s discounts due to the exporting of goods. Further, it can 
buy up the supplies itself to cut the benefits of parallel traders or reducing the supplies to a 
certain territory so that no products will be left to export. Another example of an indirect 
export ban is where the distributors are obliged to pay a fee when exporting into another 
distributors‟ territory, unless the fee relate to the value of the after-sale services that the latter 
might have to provide.
179
 A producer may wish to require information on where its products 
are sold, or impose serial numbers on its products, to make it possible to trace their movement 
between territories. The use of such practices to prevent parallel trade is considered an 
indirect export ban.
180
  
In GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission
181
, a pharmaceutical company had entered into an 
agreement with Spanish wholesalers operating a distinction between prices charged to 
wholesalers in the case of domestic resale of reimbursable drugs to pharmacies or hospitals 
and the prices charged in the case of exports of medicines to any other Member State. The 
parties thereby created an indirect export ban.  The Commission held that the agreements 
infringed Article 101(1) as they had an anti-competitive object. The General Court referred to 
the special conditions on the pharmaceutical market and partly annulled the decision holding 
that export prohibitions are not necessarily anti-competitive by their object and that it is 
necessary to examine their possible impact on the market before deciding that they infringe 
Article 101(1).
182
 The Court found that the agreements in question had anti-competitive 
effect,
183
 but that the Commission had not conducted an adequate assessment of whether the 
sales conditions fulfilled the criteria for an exemption under Article 101(3). 
The ECJ dismissed GlaxoSmithKlines‟ appeal against the General Court‟s decision since it 
considered that the operative part of the General Court‟s judgment in which it confirms the 
Commission‟s finding that the pricing system breached Article 101(1) needed not be set aside. 
Though, the ECJ did not agree with General Court that the agreement should be treated as an 
effect-based restriction rather than an object-based restriction.  Instead it held that agreements 
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aimed at prohibiting or limiting parallel trade have as their object the prevention of 
competition
184
  and that nothing in Article 101(1) indicates that agreements have to deprive 
consumers of certain advantages to have an anti-competitive object.‟185 Thereby the ECJ 
thwarted the less strict approach to the issue of the single market and parallel trade suggested 
by the General Court. 
In 2003, the Commission found that the way Yamaha operated its selective distribution 
system led to the partitioning o the single market as well as the fixing of resale prices.
186
 In its 
distribution agreements, Yamaha prohibited its distributors to sell to other than final 
customers which meant a restriction of cross-supplies, which is considered a hardcore 
restriction in Article 4(d) VBER. Further, the distributors were obliged to purchase the 
products from their national Yamaha subsidiary as well as supply solely to distributors 
appointed by the national subsidiary, both obligations restricting cross-border trade. The 
distributors where also obliged to contact Yamaha before exporting products over the Internet, 
even though no other restrictions on online sales were provided. Moreover, the agreements 
included territorial protection of warranties and restrictions of parallel trade in Iceland. 
Yamaha also had a market share over 30 %, which contributed in it failing to benefit from the 
VBER.
187
  
3.2.1 Guarantees 
Indirect export bans may also consist of agreements where the manufacturer provides that its 
guarantees only are available to the consumers in a Member State if they purchase the product 
from a distributor within the state. Since this would be a strong initiative not to buy the 
product elsewhere, the general proposition is that the same guarantees shall be available to 
customers regardless of where in the Union the product was bought.
188
 In ETA Fabriques 
d‟Ebauches v. DK Investments SA, the ECJ held that denial of the benefit of guarantees from 
goods imported from another Member State was an infringement of Article 101(1).
189
 The 
court then continued with limiting the right to guarantees to service provided after local 
standards. Hence, if a product is sold in Germany to a customer in Sweden, the customer shall 
be satisfied with the standards of the Swedish service, would they be lower than the German 
ones. Further, the manufacturer has no obligation to guarantee products sold from 
unauthorised distributors, which is one way to protect selective distribution systems.  
 
Part V - Internet distribution 
 
To describe the ways that Internet has changed the conditions under which business is carried 
out can hardly be done. At the same time as creating enormous opportunities, the growing 
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online markets have created troubles for legislators as well as market actors, by shrinking the 
world and completely change the possibility to control markets. Before discussing the matter 
of internet distribution more in detail, it is useful to shortly present how the EU has dealt with 
this new era in general.   
1. E-Commerce in the EU  
In October 2009, the commission released a communication on e-commerce in the EU.
190
 The 
Communication puts forward two key consumer benefits with cross-border online shopping, 
namely lower prices and an increased range of products to choose from.
191
 Cross-border 
online shopping increases the chance of finding cheaper offers since there is such a great 
variety of offers for the same products at the same time as it is easy for the customers to 
compare different offers. 
In 2009 an EU-wide test of online shops showed a considerable potential for cross-border 
savings, even when the costs for encouraging of customers are taken into account.
192
 In 13 of 
the 27 Member States testers were able to find at least one cross-border offer that was no less 
than 10% cheaper than the best domestic offer for more than half of the products. 
Further, cross-border shopping makes it possible for customers to find products that are not 
distributed on the domestic online market.
193
 This advantage is especially important for 
customers in smaller Member States. 
 
When e-commerce within borders is clearly growing, the cross-border online shopping has 
not seen the same development. Between 2006 and 2008, the gap between domestic and cross 
border e-commerce got bigger rather than smaller, even if the European consumers clearly 
recognise the advantages of cross-border online shopping.
194
 Hence, it is clear that the 
businesses do not fully agree on the potential of cross-border trade. Whereas 51% of EU 
retailers sell their products online, only 21% conduct sales across borders.
195
 Most of those 
retailers trade just with one or two Member States and only 4% trade with 10 Member States 
or more.
196
 Many online shops give different treatment to consumers from different territories 
and it is not unusual for customers to be hindered to register on the website or to pay for the 
products. Many websites also refuse to ship the products to the country of the consumer.
197
 
 
Whereas the fragmented European market is strongly affected by the difference in rules on 
consumer protection, VAT, recycling fees and levies,
198
 competition rules on vertical 
restraints have already made a large contribution with removing undue restrictions on e-
commerce in distribution agreements. The vertical review starting in 2008 further explored 
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whether or not within selective distribution networks manufacturers dissuade appointed 
dealers from use of the internet. 
 
1.1 EU law on E-commerce 
There are a number of different directives on how to regulate behaviour on the internet, such 
as the E-Commerce Directive
199
, the Directive on the Protection of Consumers in respect of 
Distance Contracts
200
, the EC Directive on Transborder Flows of Personal Data
201
, the 
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
202
 (the Privacy Directive) and the Data 
Retention Directive
203
. The E-commerce Directive from 2000 seeks to ensure the free 
movement of „information society services‟ across the Union. Among other things, the 
Directive covers electronic contracts, the establishment of service providers, the liability of 
intermediaries, codes of conduct, court actions and out-of-court dispute settlements. It also 
states the terms for co-operation between Member States on these issues.  
One very important function of the E-Commerce Directive is to solve the problem of 
uncertainty as to which national law shall apply. The Directive uses the principle of „Country 
of Origin‟, stating that the law shall be determined to be the one where the seller is based.204 
However, this rule does not apply to consumer transactions, where instead it is the law of the 
country from where the consumer purchases the product that is to be applied.
205
 Hence, if a 
seller wants to reach out to consumers all over the EU, it must meet the requirements of the 
laws in each and every Member State. This basically means that the „Country of Origin -
principle‟ applies to producers and wholesalers but not to retailers. It shall though be 
reminded that the laws of the Member States have been harmonized through numerous 
directives and this inconsistency shall therefore not create such a heavy burden.  
General rules on private international law and the jurisdiction of courts still apply, such as the 
Brussels Convention, the Lugano Convention, the Brussels Regulation and the Rome 
Convention. 
2. EU Competition Law on online distribution 
Online trading creates special problems within distribution law since internet makes it 
possible for retailers to reach out to customers all around the world, far beyond the agreed 
territories, in ways that might be hard to control. It also increases the possibilities for 
counterfeiting and fraud.
206
 The numerous ways in which manufacturers have tried to keep 
control of their distributors‟ online behaviour and the retailers‟ use of the Internet in ways not 
agreed upon has forced the legislators to start regulating the ways in which online distribution 
can be restricted. The issue was acknowledged in the Vertical Guidelines from 2000 and was 
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in focus when the Guidelines and VBER were to be renewed. Generally, online sales are to be 
treated as offline sales and attempts by a supplier to discourage online selling by retailers are 
typically within the scope of Article 101(1).
207
 Though, as will be seen, a few restrictions are 
allowed, especially regarding active sales and quality requirements.  
2.1 The review of the old guidelines 
When the Commission officially started its review the VBER and the Vertical Guidelines in 
the fall of 2008 the main issues were the application of the concepts of “active” and “passive” 
sales on the internet and the suppliers' ability to restrict online sales by distributors within 
exclusive and selective distribution systems. For selective distribution, the review explored 
whether the requirements used to select distributors can be justified on grounds of consumer 
welfare and whether or not such criteria will unduly limit online and cross-border 
transactions. The review also examined whether or not a manufacturer or supplier can prevent 
appointed dealers from using the internet.
208
  
To ensure to find the most suitable solutions to the issues mentioned above, the Commission 
consulted the stakeholders. Their first big possibility to give the Commission their opinion on 
the matter was the Consumer and industry Roundtable on Opportunities and barriers to 
online retailing and the European Single Market in September 2008, where Commissioner 
Neelie Kroes invited several senior consumer and industry representatives to discuss the 
business opportunities created by the Internet and the existing barriers to increased online 
retailing in Europe. Before the meeting, the Commission sent out an Issues Paper, searching 
answers from undertakings regarding online distribution.
209
 Overall, the outcome of the 
Roundtable discussions was hardly surprising: the representatives for luxury products, such as 
LVMH (Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton) argued that selective criteria for online sales shall 
comply with the criteria for retailers with a physical pint of sales, since it is in the interest of 
both the businesses and the consumers to preserve brand image and prevent free riding.
210
 
EBay on the other hand, as a leading figure of the pro-internet lobby, wanted the Commission 
to consider all restrictions on online sales as hardcore restrictions within the VBER, leaving it 
for the supplier to prove that the criteria in Article 101(3) are fulfilled in each individual 
case.
211
 
 
After considering the results of the Roundtable and Issues Paper, the Commission released a 
draft of the VBER
212
 and the Guidelines
213
 giving a final possibility for interested companies, 
authorities and organisations to influence the new rules. When reading the submissions it is 
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clear that the promoters for selective distribution were more satisfied with the drafts than was 
the pro-internet lobby. 
LVMH welcomed the maintenance of the suppliers‟ freedom to choose its own distribution 
model
214
 and stated that selective distribution is at the heart of the business model for the 
luxury goods industry.
215
 It put forward four consumer benefits from selective distribution: 
service, experience, choice and protection
216
 and reminded that the system of selective 
distribution has proved to be efficient during the last VBER and therefore shall not be 
eliminated or put at risk.
217
 While recognizing how e-commerce offers new opportunities for 
luxury brands by being a complement to brick and mortar shops, it clearly stated that online 
sales must be regulated not to weaken the viability of the physical network. Pure players, that 
is, retailers selling exclusively online, may be willing to comply with the criteria for online 
sales and therefore argue that they should have the right to sell the products online. LVMH 
pointed out that this will make it difficult for the other distributors to get a fair share of the 
online market. The pure players are experts on the internet market and have also got the 
possibility to invest the money on online marketing instead of investing in brick and mortar 
shops. Since the pure players can keep their prices far below those in the physical shops, it 
would lead to the customers choosing the products in the brick and mortar shops to then 
purchase them online.
218
 This would not only be devastating for the authorised offline 
distributors, but also for the whole industry, since it would lead to the disappearance of the 
very sought for physical shops.  
LVMH also stated that quality criteria and standards must be determined according to the 
means of the distribution channel. Priority should be given to those who manage high-quality 
internet sites for online sales of luxury brands, but the vast majority of consumers still require 
a connection to a network of physical shops.
219
  
On the opposite side of LVMH, eBay continued to argue that all restrictions on online sales 
shall be considered as hardcore and therefore not be covered by the VBER at all.
220
 Since the 
distributor often is in a weaker position vis-a-vis its supplier, it shall be for the supplier to 
prove that the restriction shall be exempted by Article 101(3).
221
  
Although aiming to protect small businesses, eBay mainly argued from a consumer 
perspective, claiming that some of the Commissions choices are inconsistent with competition 
and consumer choice.
222
 The company criticised the right for the supplier to stop pure players 
by requiring its distributors to have at least one or more brick and mortar shops, claiming that 
such a requirement has no qualitative benefits.
223
 According to eBay, consumer satisfaction is 
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higher for online sales than for sales in brick and mortar shops, which makes the latter 
unnecessary in the sales of most products. 
Regarding selective distribution, eBay argued for a cautious treatment that only allows such 
systems where they are necessary, rather than the systematic approach that has ruled the last 
decade.
224
 EBay‟s attempts to change the quite supplier friendly line of the Commission did 
not succeed and most of the drafted rules were kept.  
2.2 Current VBER and Guidelines regarding online sales 
The main view in the VBER and the Guidelines is that online sales should be restricted in a 
way equivalent to the treatment of offline sales.
225
 Since all distributors shall be free to use the 
internet to reach a great variety of end users, any restrictions that are not equivalent to the 
criteria imposed for the sales from the brick and mortar shop are considered hardcore 
restrictions and will exclude the whole agreement from benefitting from the VBER. That the 
restrictions must be equivalent does not mean that they have to be identical, but rather that 
they should aim for the same purpose and achieve comparable results and that any differences 
in the requirements must be justified by the differences in the nature of the sales methods.
226
 
The Guidelines provide that it is possible to have stricter rules on how many items can be sold 
to the same end user online than offline where it is easier for unauthorised dealers to obtain 
the products in question over the internet.
227
 Where it instead is easier to obtain the products 
from a brick and mortar shop, the supplier may have stricter restrictions on such sales. Further 
it is allowed for a distributor to demand faster delivery times for offline sales, where it often is 
possible to deliver directly unlike for online sales. The after sales costs may also differ, due to 
requirements on online after-sales services and for the appliance of secure payment 
systems.
228
 The VBER exempts selective distribution agreements regardless of the nature of 
the product and of the selection criteria.
229
 Though, where an agreement include provisions 
that are not required by the nature of the product in question, the VBER is likely to be 
withdrawn, since the system does not bring about sufficient pro-competitive effects to 
counterbalance the a substantial loss of intra-brand competition.
230
   
2.2.1 The principle of „Brick and Click‟ 
The supplier has the right to require that a distributor has at least one brick and mortar 
shop.
231
 As with other demands, such requirements will only be lawful when the product in 
question is of such nature that it requires a physical outlet.
232
 As has been said above, the 
decision of mentioning this right in the paragraph and thereby create an assumption that it is a 
lawful demand, has been applauded by the luxury industry and criticised by the pro-internet 
lobby. 
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The American Bar Association have raised concerns regarding the right of a distributor which 
has one brick and mortar shop in one Member State to sell both actively and passively to 
authorised distributors and end users all over the Union via the Internet.
233
 The Association 
suggested that it should be allowed for suppliers to restrict the territory in which the 
distributor may conduct online selling. Although a good reminder for suppliers, the 
suggestion fails to take into consideration the aim for market integration which is one of the 
fundaments of the European Competition Law, which shows the difference in the view of the 
role of Competition Law in the EU and the US. 
There are not many cases to be found regarding this issue, but a French case concerned the 
right of a pure online distributor to gain access to the selective distribution network of a watch 
manufacturer (Festina).
234
 The French competition authority accepted commitments from 
Festina to amend its distribution agreement to introduce the possibility for current and future 
distributors to sell over the internet. The authority agreed to let Festina refuse to extend its 
network to companies selling exclusively over the internet and thus allowing it to require that 
its distributors have at least one Brick and Mortar shop.  
2.2.2 Restraints considered hardcore 
Article 4(c) VBER provides that the restriction of both active and passive sales to end users 
by members of a selective distribution system operating at the retail level of trade is 
considered a hardcore restraint. It is considered necessary that the dealers within a selective 
distribution system shall be free to sell, both actively and passively, offline or on the Internet, 
to all end users.
235
  
2.2.2.a Active and passive sales online 
The Guidelines clearly state that every distributor must be free to use the internet for the sales 
and advertising of products.
236
 Having a website that is accessible to all without targeting 
certain customers is not considered as active sales making and where a selling is the result of 
a customer visiting the distributor‟s website and then contacting the distributor himself, it is a 
matter of passive selling which cannot be restricted by the supplier, even in case of exclusive 
distribution. The distributor is allowed both to accept and to carry out the request.
237
 The 
supplier may not oblige the distributor to guarantee that transactions are to be cancelled when 
credit card addresses reveal the purchaser to be located in another territory.
238
 Further, the 
supplier may not require that the distributor prevent customers located in another territory to 
view its website. Neither may he demand that the distributor automatically reroute customers 
to other distributors or to the manufacturer‟s website. However, the supplier may require that 
the distributor, on its website, offer links to websites of other distributors and/or the supplier.  
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 On the other hand, when a distributor‟s website is specifically targeted at another 
distributor‟s customers, for example through links put in pages exclusively available for those 
customers, this is normally seen as active selling.
239
 The same applies when the distributor e-
mails one or several customers directly. Restrictions on active selling into other territories are 
allowed in exclusive distribution agreements; however, a supplier may not stop the members 
from its selective distribution system to actively sell to end users, or to one another, whether 
or not on different levels of the distribution chain.
240
 
2.2.2.b Limit the proportion of sales made online 
The supplier may not force the distributor to limit the proportion of sales made online.
241
 
Though, it shall be possible for a supplier to require an absolute amount of sales to be made 
offline, so that the supplier can be sure that customers who wish may see the products nicely 
presented in real life.
 242
 The supplier may require different amounts of offline sales from 
different distributors, as long as the decision are based on objective criteria, e.g. geographic 
location or the size of the part the distributor play in the supplier‟s distribution network. The 
rule has been criticised for hindering the supplier to protect those distributors who make really 
high investments in their Brick and Mortar shops.
 243
 It has also been questioned whether it is 
justified to prohibit a supplier of an experience product with a small market share from 
demanding that the consumers shall have a possibility to have direct contact with the product 
before purchasing.
244
 Further, it has been argued that the Guidelines contradict themselves in 
allowing a supplier to require its distributors to have at least one physical sales point, but then 
restricting the extent to which this possibility may efficiently be used. It would be in line with 
this rule to allow the suppliers to require a minimum percentage of sales to be made offline.
245
 
The Guidelines do not give any guidance on how the certain amount shall be calculated. The 
lack of such guidance has been acknowledged by the American Bar Association, asking the 
Commission to clarify the amount or value of sales that may be restricted within the safe 
harbour of the VBER.
246
 
It seems natural that a supplier, when deciding which amount to be required, would look at 
the numbers from the last year‟s sales of the distributor and then require that an amount equal 
to a certain percentage of those sales to be traded in a Brick and Mortar shop. It also makes 
sense that the Commission would look at last year‟s sales when assessing whether an agreed 
amount is too high. Though, it remains to be seen if this really will be the case, as well as 
what amounts will be accepted.  
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In 2003 a case was brought to the Federal Supreme Court in Germany, regarding restriction 
on online sales.
247
 A perfume manufacturer reserved the right to terminate its distribution 
agreements when the distributor sold a certain percentage of all sales online, or when the total 
online sales exceeded the sales in the Brick and Mortar shops. The Federal Supreme Court 
accepted the clause, stressing that it is for the manufacturer to protect its distribution channels 
that might have a negative effect on the branded products aura of exclusivity. The limit on 
50% was considered reasonable (german: angemessen). The ruling is yet to be confirmed 
since it is the only case that has been brought to the Federal Supreme Court on this matter. 
 
As can be seen, the case is not in compliance with the current Vertical Guidelines, which do 
not allow percentage restrictions on online sales, but only minimum requirements for offline 
sales. However it is interesting not only that the Court granted a limitation based on 
percentage of sales, but also that such a high requirement of offline sales was accepted.  
2.2.2.c Demand higher prices for products intended to be resold online 
A supplier may not require higher prices for products intended to be resold online. However, a 
fixed fee can be agreed to support the offline or online sales efforts.
248
 The fee has to be based 
on differentials in costs between the different distribution models and may not vary depending 
on offline turnover, since this would constitute an indirect form of dual pricing. This solution 
has been criticised for making „no commercial sense‟ since it will be hard for the supplier to 
regain the investment if it cannot be connected to the actual sales.
249
 It has also been criticised 
for failing to consider the fact that different distribution methods often have different sales 
costs per unit.
250
 Further, The American Chamber of Commerce to the EU has stated that the 
rule constitutes a potential heavy administrative burden on suppliers, which normally do not 
have efficient information about the costs of their distributors.
251
 The Chamber argues that a 
supplier with marginal market power should be free to demand different prices for products 
sold through different channels as long as this behaviour does not effectively prevent online 
sales.  
2.2.3 The right to go online 
Another question is whether a distributor wishing to start selling products online needs to ask 
for permission from the supplier if their agreement does not touch upon this issue. 
Considering that the Guidelines state that each distributor shall have the right to use internet 
for sales and advertisement, the answer should be negative. However, it is not entirely clear 
and the issue has been addressed on both EU- and national level. 
 
The French case Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmetique SA v Alain Breckler
252
from 1999 
concerned a ban on online sales of cosmetics. The selective distribution agreement between 
Pierre Fabre and Breckler made no reference to online sales and when Pierre Fabre found out 
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that Breckler was selling its products on the internet, it asked the court to order Breckler to 
cease with this conduct. The Tribunal did not consider itself in the power to do so. Instead it 
held that restrictions on sales in distribution agreements are to be interpreted strictly and that 
no ban could be implied in the absence of a mentioned restriction. The online selling was 
considered a new marketing method, and could therefore not be stopped by the Tribunal. 
 
On the other hand, in EU Law it seems to be possible to agree that a distributor must ask for 
permission before starting to sell the products online. Back in 2002, when agreements still 
could be cleared by the Commission, B&W Loudspeakers Ltd got clearance for its distribution 
agreements on the condition that it removed the outright ban on online sales.
253
 It should be 
possible for retailers to request permission from B&W to undertake distance selling, including 
on the internet. B&W could refuse such requests only in writing and based on criteria 
regarding the maintenance of the brand image and the reputation of the contracted products. 
The criteria had to be comparable to the criteria for offline sales and had to be applied 
indiscriminately. Even though this decision was based on the old rules, nothing in the new 
Guidelines implies that there has been a change.  
3. Online Auction Platforms 
The purpose of online auction platforms is to connect buyers and sellers and acting as an 
intermediary for third party buying and selling. By acting as an intermediary, the platform 
aims to provide a safe framework for online trade. Today there are a large number of different 
platforms, connection millions of people on a daily basis and there is no doubt that online 
auction platforms are important factors in the market for online sales and also for the overall 
businesses. The growing trade on online auction platforms has created problems for suppliers 
selling through selective distribution systems. Even if a supplier may keep its own system 
closed and effective so that no unauthorised resellers get their hand on the products, they may 
still end up on such a platform at a later stage since a supplier cannot control the behaviour of 
its distributors‟ customers. Question arises whether this could be harmful for the brand. In its 
contribution to the new VBER and Guidelines, eBay argued that the shops on eBay are just as 
good as other online stores.
254
 LVMH on the other hand showed a survey where 65% of the 
customers considered it harmful for luxury brands to be sold on such platforms.
 255
 
 
EBay had commissioned a survey showing that platforms such as improve consumer welfare 
in many different ways, especially through price savings.
256
 According to this, costumers in 
the UK, Germany and France can save about 17% by purchasing new products, such as 
computers, electronics and clothing on eBay rather than in an offline store.
257
 The total 
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savings of European users on the eBay platform are an estimated EUR 1.1 billion per annum 
for new products.258  
By providing the consumers with extensive listings from local, national and international 
sellers, eBay argued that it gives the consumers‟ search and transaction costs. The company 
also stated that online auction platforms impede trade between Member States by connecting 
trading partners from different locations within the European Union.  
3.1 Counterfeit and fraud 
A big problem with online trading platforms is that they constitute a heavenly market place 
for the trading of counterfeited goods. This was discussed at the Online Roundtable 
Discussion, where eBay made it clear that they are well aware of the problem and that they 
are working hard to prevent such conduct.
259
  
3.2 EU Competition Law on Online Auction Platforms 
According to the current Guidelines, a supplier has the right to prevent its distributors from 
selling the products on third party platforms, where such platforms do not comply with the 
standards in the distribution agreement.
260
 The supplier may also impose certain conditions 
for the use of third party platforms. For example, a distributor which homepage is hosted by a 
third party platform may be required to guarantee that customers do not „visit the distributor's 
website through a site carrying the name or logo of the third party platform.‟261 Given this 
wording, it is possible for a supplier to prevent a retailer from selling the contracted products 
on an eBay store, or to require certain conditions on which the retailer can use such store for 
the distribution of the goods. 
 There are no cases in EU Law addressing the issue, although two German cases from 2009 
can give some guidance on the matter.  They are overall in compliance with the new rules, but 
suggest a higher protection of the suppliers‟ rights to restrict the online behaviour of its 
distributors.  
In Scout
262
, a manufacturer of popular satchels and backpacks had seized to supply a retailer 
who had distributed those products via eBay. Such sales did not meet the quality requirements 
set out in the selective distribution agreement between the manufacturer and the retailer, why 
the supplier seized to supply the retailer who then asked the court to order a continuance of 
the supply. The Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe (OLG Karlsruhe), declined to impose a 
duty to supply, stating that a prohibition on online auction sales does not constitute a 
restriction of competition, when within a permissible selective distribution system. Such a 
prohibition was to be considered analogous to quality requirements regarding minimum 
standards on Brick and Mortar outlets and the Court therefore found it unnecessary to 
examine whether an exemption could be made pursuant to the VBER or Article 101(3) TFEU. 
The Court then went even further by saying that the same principle would apply to non luxury 
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products, especially to branded goods that manufacturers consider as top-of-the range 
products. This consideration shall be based on the objective characteristics of the products and 
be of qualitative art, for example aim to present the products in an adequate way or to provide 
competent advice. In its ruling, the Court rejected the view from the Regional Court in Berlin, 
which in a similar case suggested that an overall prohibition of distribution through eBay was 
illegitimate.  
 
The decision of the OLG Karlsruhe is in compliance with the decision of the Higher Regional 
Court of Munich (OLG Munich) of 2 July 2009
263
, where the Court allowed Amer, a 
manufacturer of sports products to prohibit its distributors to resell its products through 
auction websites. The German Association against Unfair Competition had sued Amer 
claiming that Amer's prohibition on direct or indirect resale through auction websites was 
against the law. Notable in this case is that Amer‟s distributors were not part of a selective 
distribution network.  As Amer had a market share below 30%, the case would be exempted 
by the VBER and OLG Munich did not examine whether such a restriction would be an 
infringement of Article 101(1). The Court held that a prohibition on online auction sales does 
not constitute a customer restriction pursuant to Article 4(b) of the VBER, since online 
auction buyers do not constitute a separate group of customers within the group of internet 
buyers. Instead the Court stated that a resell prohibition through auction websites was simply 
a quality requirement related to Internet sales and not to be considered a hardcore restriction 
within the meaning of the VBER. 
 
The Court further declared that it is lawful for Amer to prevent its distributors from indirect 
sales through auction websites, that is, prohibit its distributors from reselling to retailers who 
would sell the products on such websites. The allowance of indirect bans and the fact that 
Amer‟s distributors were not part of a selective distribution system shows that the Court opens 
for a soft approach towards restrictions on certain forms of Internet sales. It remains to be 
seen which approach the Community Courts will take on the issue. 
4. Free-riding online 
It seems as though the Commission has the view that online distributors are more likely to 
free-ride on offline distributors than vice versa.
264
 Even if this paper is not a study in either 
business- or customer behaviour, this is an assumption that has to be questioned when 
analysing the new rules on online distribution.  Chevalier holds that the free-riding issue goes 
both ways
265
 and eBay argued in its submission to the new Guidelines that the assumption 
that online retailers would free-ride on retailers with physical outlets is „simply 
unsubstantiated‟.266 
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It is not under dispute that the maintenance of a high standard Brick and Mortar shop with 
good location and service requires significant investments. However, it is also clear that it is 
hard to run an online shop where customers actually want to buy products, since the 
alternatives are only a couple of mouse clicks away. Online it is easy for the customers not 
only to gather retailers selling the product sought for and show the different pricings, but also 
to gain information about the services provided in the shops, thanks to previous customer 
ratings.  
Although many customers try out products in a Brick and Mortar shop to later purchase them 
online for a lower price, certain customer groups are more likely to sit at home and compare 
products on online shops before they purchase the items in a brick and mortar shop.
267
 On the 
Internet they can read not only about the characteristics of the products, but also what experts 
and other customers think about it. After making such a comparison many customers then 
choose one, two or more products to see in real life in a suitable physical sales point. The staff 
in the shop then is in a quite pleasant position where they just have to welcome the already 
informed customer and show the product(s) asked for before assisting in the purchase. 
Though, many customers are likely to then return and purchase the product online, whereas 
others still prefer buying a product and being able to bring it home instead of waiting for a 
package to be delivered. 
This said, it seems more likely that online retailers would free-ride on offline retailers than 
vice versa. The possibility for the supplier to require its distributors to have at least one Brick 
and Mortar shop and to require certain amount to be sold offline is therefore rational. 
However, it may vary depending on the circumstances and  it is good that the Guidelines do 
open up for the possibility that online sales may require more investments
268
 and thereby 
acknowledge the work that online distributors will have to do, especially considering that all 
restraints shall be proportional and required by the nature of the products in question.  
4.1 Alternatives to Selective Distribution 
Selective distribution, together with other vertical restraints, has for long been regarded as a 
solver of the free-riding problem, making it one of the most important justifications for the 
adoption of such systems. The pro-internet lobby questions the importance of selective 
distribution and stresses that there are several other ways that the problem with free riding 
may be solved.
269
 The issue has been acknowledged in the Vertical Guidelines, where the 
Commission states that it should be ensured that the least anti-competitive restraint shall be 
used to solve a certain problem.
270
 Another restraint should be used if it would solve the 
problem to a comparative cost. As an example, instant service requirements are mentioned. 
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The pro-internet lobby has put forward a few different alternatives. First of all, it argues that 
the problem could be solved through “incentive contracts” where online retailers face higher 
wholesale charges than Brick and Mortar retailers, to compensate the latter for their 
investments in facilities and services.
271
 One way of doing this is to let the wholesale price 
vary depending on effective sales, so that the retailers will have incentives to invest in 
appropriate services and protection of the supplier‟s brand image. It could further be solved 
through supporting payments from the supplier, to give incentives to marketing efforts. 
 
Other alternatives put forward are specific payment schemes, franchising and direct supplier 
investments.
272
 These alternatives can be used by the supplier to create effective incentives for 
the distributors to offer an optimal level of service to the customers without using vertical 
restrictions such as selective distribution. 
 
Part VI - Conclusion 
In the introductory part of this thesis I asked the following questions. 
 What interests are protected in the new VBER and Vertical Guidelines? Is market 
integration in focus or are they inspired by a more economical approach?  
 Are the rules foremost protecting the freedom of the supplier to choose in which way 
to distribute its goods, or are they more concerned with consumer welfare? 
 What changes are made regarding selective distribution? 
 Has the Commission succeeded in its aim to clarify the rules on online sales? 
 Has legal certainty got lost in the aim for flexibility and the effect based approach? 
To start with, the new VBER and Guidelines can hardly be called revolutionary. In lack of 
clear judgments from the Community Courts on the old rules, the Commission has more than 
anything else tried to find a way of translating the rules on offline distribution to online sales. 
The Commission continues towards a more economic approach, but is clearly influenced with 
the Single Market Imperative, which can be seen in the tough treatment of restraints hindering 
parallel trade and the protection of differential price settings on markets within the European 
Union. Regarding the interest of the suppliers, it was clear already in the consultation process 
that the promoters for suppliers‟ right to impose selective distribution systems were far more 
positive than the pro-internet lobby. Even if the latter claimed to act in the interest of the 
consumers, it is important to distinguish between short-term and long-term consumer benefits; 
the investments from the manufacturers and distributors must be protected in order to keep a 
wide range of products for the consumers to choose from in the future. It is therefore not 
accurate to say that rules that are beneficial for the suppliers necessarily are harmful for 
consumers.  
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1. Changes regarding selective distribution 
Apart from the rules on online distribution, the only real difference regarding selective 
distribution is that the supplier now only may restrict members of a selective distribution 
system from selling to unauthorised distributors within the territory reserved by the supplier to 
operate the system. Luckily, the wording from the drafted Guidelines was changed to clarify 
that authorised distributors do not have the right to sell the products to unauthorised dealers in 
territories where the supplier is yet to put the product on the market.  
The new provision makes it difficult for suppliers to impose different distribution systems in 
different parts of the European Union. It will be hard for a supplier which applies a selective 
distribution system in some, but not all, EU markets to prevent distributors in markets without 
such system from reselling the products to unauthorised distributors in markets where a 
selective distribution system is adopted. The new rule creates problems that may put whole 
selective distribution systems at risk. It might lead to an extended use of selective distribution 
systems, even on markets where other alternatives are at hand, which does not correspond to 
the statement in the Vertical Guidelines that the least anti-competitive restraint shall be used 
to solve a certain problem.  
One short term solution should be for the supplier to require its authorised distributors to 
purchase the contracted products either from the supplier itself or from each other. Such non-
compete clauses are exempted by the VBER as long as the contracting parties are within the 
30 % market threshold and the requirements are limited to maximum five years
273
 and may be 
combined with selective distribution.
274
 However, this is not a solution to be relied upon in the 
long term; more lasting solutions need to be found. 
2. Do the new rules clarify the issue with online distribution? 
The Commission has only partly succeeded in clarifying the issue with online distribution. 
The definitions of “active” and “passive” sales are quite clear and useful. However, regarding 
the restrictions more directly connected to selective distribution, quite a few question marks 
still remain.  
The supplier may not force the distributor to limit the proportion of sales made online. 
Though, it shall be possible for a supplier to require an absolute amount of sales to be made 
offline. The Guidelines do not give any directions on how the certain amount shall be 
calculated. It seems natural that a supplier, when deciding which amount to be required, 
would look at the numbers from the last year‟s sales of the distributor and then require that an 
amount equal to a certain percentage of those sales to be traded in a brick and mortar shop. It 
also makes sense that the Commission would look at the percentage of last year‟s sales when 
assessing whether an agreed amount is too high. Though, it remains to be seen if this really 
will be the case, as well as what requirements will be accepted.  
It is regretful that the Commission has set out such a rule without any further guidance, 
although the possibility to set certain thresholds disappears together with the rule itself. It 
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would not be efficient to mention certain amounts or values in the Guidelines. At the same 
time; to mention a threshold concerning percentage of sales would go straight against the rule. 
The rule is likely to create uncertainties and it will also be difficult to interpret future decision 
and judgments without connecting the set amount with percentage of sales or turnover.  
 
Considering that the Guidelines state that each distributor shall have the right to use internet 
for sales and advertisement, a distributor should not have to ask for permission of the supplier 
in order to start distributing online. However, since the Commission itself has accepted 
agreements where the supplier had the right to deny distributors the right to go online, a 
clarification on the matter would have been eligible. The absence of such clarification might 
be based on an unwillingness to make a decision on the matter. It must though be assumed 
that suppliers generally cannot stop their distributors from online sales, considering that it is 
not accepted to limit the proportion of sales made online. 
 
The fact that a supplier may not require higher prices for products intended to be resold 
online, but may impose a fixed fee to support the offline or online sales efforts is a clear 
attempt to strengthen online distribution. Since products sold in brick and mortar shops 
normally have a higher price per unit, many distributors will only make such efforts to the 
extent it will be profitable and often not exceeding what they are the required to according to 
the contract. At the same time the supplier will only pay such fees to the extent the investment 
will result in upstream profits. If it is not possible to base the fees on actual turnover it should 
be possible to connect them to the minimum amount having to be resold offline. However, the 
Guidelines have not made such a connection and it remains to be seen if it is going to be a 
convergence between the two in the future appliance of the rules. 
3. Legal certainty 
The effect based approach is positive in its flexibility and creates the possibility for the new 
rules to survive another decade of technical development. However it might be hard for the 
market actors to foresee the effects their agreements may have on competition. The VBER 
creates a safe harbour for the agreements covered by it and in many cases the rules are clear 
and easy to apply. Though, as stated above, a few uncertainties remain. Furthermore, the 
possibility to withdraw the benefit of VBER even if the agreement as such does not create the 
anti-competitive effect, creates additional uncertainty and puts high requirements for 
undertakings to have knowledge of the rest of the market. At the same time it might be 
essential for the Commission and the Community Courts to take the whole market situation 
into account to ensure an undistorted competition, why a definite exemption is not an 
alternative. 
4. The future 
It seems as though the Commission has tried hard to balance the different interests against 
each other when constructing the new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and 
accompanying Guidelines. When searching to keep the economic approach presented in year 
2000, it is still clear that the Commission has been strongly influenced aim for a single 
50 
 
market. The new rules offer good possibilities for distributors operating both on- and offline, 
whilst strengthening the suppliers‟ position against pure internet retailers. It remains to be 
seen if this is a way of baby stepping into the e-society or if the approach will survive another 
ten years of technical development. The future of EU Competition Law is now in the hands on 
the Community Courts, which have an important role in implementing and applying the new 
rules to clarify the remaining uncertainties.  
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